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II.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A court may certify a class action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 (b )(3) only if it is satisfied, "after a rigorous analysis," 1
that the plaintiffs have met the Rule 23(a) requirements of

* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author
thanks Timothy S. Bishop, Joo Hyang Kim, Nathaniel Persily, and Catherine
Struve for their comments and assistance in the preparation of this Article. A
previous version was presented at the 20th Annual Federal Securities Institute
Conference on February 14, 2002, and benefited from the discussion at that
session. As an associate with the Chicago office of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw,
the author participated in the representation of the defendants in Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001), which is
discussed infra Part IV. The views expressed in this Article do not necessaril y
reflect those of Mayer Brown.
1. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
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numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and also shown
that " the [common] questions of Jaw or fact . .. predominate over
any questions affecting individual members and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy." 2 The text of the Rule might seem
to erect formidable barriers, but for years it has been received
wisdom in the legal community that the degree of difficulty in
getting a class certified depends in large part on the substantive
theory of recovery. 3 In particular, consensus holds that allegations
of securities fraud are particularly suitable for class action
treatment. 4 Basic v. Levinson 5 cut the individualized issue of
reliance out of the Securities and Exchange Commission's standard
Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action, 6 replacing it with the common issues of
7
materiality and market efficiency, and the rest is history.
In
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 8 the Supreme Court notably
failed to shake up this settled understanding, commenting that
"[p ]redominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging
2. FED. R . Crv. P. 23(b)(3).
3. See U.S.C.S. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 23 note (1998) (History;
Ancillary Laws and Directives) (outlining causes of action generally thought to
sustain a class action and those thought to be less certifiable).
4. !d.
5. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
7. Basic endorsed the "fraud-on-the-market" theory, which allowed plaintiffs to
forego individual proof of reliance on the grounds that they had purchased securities
on the market "in reliance on the integrity of that price." Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. In
an efficient market, where "most publicly available information is reflected in
market price," public misrepresentations will be impounded in the price, and "an
investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be
presumed for purposes of a Rule 1Ob-5 action." !d. Making reliance a common
issue, rather than an individual one, dramatically alters the Rule 23(b )(3) calculus.
Plaintiffs typically have great difficulty obtaining class certification for common
law fraud claims, precisely because the individualized nature of the reliance
analysis tends to predominate over common issues. See, e.g., Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Corp., 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A] fraud class action cannot be
certified when individual reliance will be an issue."). Moreover, the presumed
effect on the market typically allows plaintiffs to demonstrate the fact of injury by
common proof-proof that the market price declined after the truth came to light.
See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 179-80
(3d Cir. 2001) (stating that investors who trade in a stock affected by fraudulent
information are presumed injured in fraud-on-the-market cases, but plaintiffs in
securities class actions can establish loss on a common basis only if the evidence
indicates that each plaintiff suffered some loss).
8. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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consumer or securities fraud. " 9
Securities class actions now
typically follow what one court has called an "all too familiar
path" :10 motions practice and discovery "of massive proportions," 11
followed by settlement on the eve of trial. 12
How familiar is this pattern? A recent empirical survey of
class actions in four federal districts over a two-year period found
that a "(b )(3) class was certified in 94% to 100% of the securities
cases .... " 13 Such data have caused one commentator to opine that
the securities class action is no longer best understood as a lawsuit at
all. 14 Instead, he argues, these suits "have more in common with
business deals than they do with traditional adversarial litigation,"
and "the attorneys' activities are primarily business-oriented, not
legal, in nature." 15
This Article is written in the conviction that things are not
quite as bad as all that (or quite as good, depending on which side of
the case caption you are on). In many cases, class certification is not
a foregone conclusion, and defense counsel would be well advised to
oppose it vigorously. The purpose of this Article is to explore the
situations in which such opposition has the best chance of success.
Part II examines the easiest case for class certification. Part III
discusses the ways in which allegations of securities fraud may
depart from that paradigm case. Next, Part IV examines a recent
decision of the Third Circuit that illustrates the correct approach to
certification analysis. Finally, Part V sketches the most promising
arguments with which to oppose motions for class certification in the
securities fraud context.
Revisiting these issues is particularly timely given the 1998
adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(£), which allows, at
the circuit court's discretion, immediate appeal of class certification

9. !d. at 625.
10. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
11. !d.; see also Thomas W. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23
To Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 91 (1996) (noting
that "securities complaints contained more frequent use of boilerplate allegations"
than other Rule 23(b)(3) class action complaints surveyed).
12. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 1374.
13. Willging et al., supra note 11, at 89 (reviewing cases from the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of Florida, the Northern District of
Illinois, and the Northern District of California).
14. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO.
L.J. 371, 372 (2001).
15. !d.

.~,
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rulings. 16 Prior to the adoption of Rule 23(f), the district court's
decision on class certification freq uently ended the case, one way or
the other, as a practical matter: the defendants would settle if the
17
class was certified, and the plaintiffs would give up if it was not.
\\lith appellate review unavai lable, most of the development of the
Rule 23(b)(3) standards took place at the district court level. Rule
23(f) has allowed the appellate courts back into the process, and they
have given every indication that they intend to take an active role.
As Judge Easterbrook put it recently, district courts for too long have
been forced to rely on "only decisions from other district judges,
most in cases later settled and thus not subject to appellate
consideration. By granting review now, we can consider w hether
these cases correctly understood the applicable principles." 18 When
the appellate consideration is over, the conventiona l wisdom on Rule
23(b )(3) certifications in securities fraud cases will likely hav e
undergone substantial revision, with more rigorous analys is of the

16. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(f).
17. Class certification can be a powerful inducement to settlement. With a
large plaintiff class certified, the magnitude of potential liability can cow even
defendants who believe the possibility of being held liable is slight. See, e.g., In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing
settlem ents induced by small probability of immense judgment as "blackmail
settlements"). Conversely, it has long been recognized that denials of certification
can sound the death knell for a class action because plaintiffs lack a sufficient stake
to proceed individually. See generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463, 470 (1978) (rejecting "death knell" doctrine as basis for appellate jurisdiction).
As the Advisory Committee Notes indicate, Rule 23(f) was enacted to allow
appellate review in just such circumstances, and most circuits that have considered
the issue now hold that practical termination of the case, coupled with a substantial
question as to the correctness of the certification decision, warrants exercise of
appellate jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ . P. 23 advisory comm ittee's note (1998)
(stating that appeal is appropriate when "as a practical matter, the decision on
certification is likely dispositive of the litigation"); see also In re Surnitomo Copper
Litig., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[P]etitioners seeking leave to appeal
pursuant to Rule 23(f) must demonstrate either (1) that the certification order will
effectively terminate the litigation and there has been a substantial showing that the
district court's decision is questionab le, or (2) that the certification order implicates a
legal question about which there is a compelling need for immediate resolution.");
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir.
2001) (stating that the court should consider the following factors, among others,
when deciding whether to grant appellate review of a certification order: (1) whether
the order would have the effect of ending the case; (2) whether the ruling was
erroneous; and (3) whether an appeal would facilitate the development of the law on
class certification).
18. Szabo v. Bridgeport Mach., 249 F.3d 672,675 (7th C ir. 200 1).

I
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class certification factors becoming the nonn and denial of
certification in securities cases becoming more commonplace. 19

II.

P AR;\DIGM CASES, OR, vVHA TWAS JUSTICE GINSBURG
THINKlNG?

The place to start is with the Supreme Court's aside in
Amchem, which comes nearest to an authoritative pronouncement on
the subject. 20 That dictum (the case before the Court was a mass
tort) seems to neatly encapsulate the conventional wisdom? 1
However, as the Court was careful to say, its observation applied
only to certain securities fraud cases, and only to the predominance
.
27
reqmrement. Amchem certainly does not support the proposition that
certification is appropriate for all securities fraud cases. 23 However,
it would be folly to deny that some securities fraud allegations are
easy cases for class certification. After Basic, there is one prime
candidate, the paradigm case that presumably informed Justice
Ginsburg's statement in Amchem.
The paradigm case involves a single public misrepresentation
about the underlying value of a security and, a short time thereafter,
a single public disclosure of the truth.
Following the
misrepresentation, the security's price rises sharply, and after
disclosure it exhibits an equally sharp correction. Many small
investors who purchase the security on the open market after the
misrepresentation and before the corrective disclosure bring suit.
19. See id. (holding that the cases did not correctly understand the applicable
principles); see also James D. Weidner, Rule 23(/) Appeals, 1269 PLI/CORP. 717,
739 (2001) (arguing that because of its "propensity to hear Rule 23(f) appeals," the
Seventh Circuit "[has] the potential to create a highly developed law on class actions,
which other courts will then look to for guidance"). The same could now be said of
the Third Circuit.
20. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
21. !d. at 625 (stating that many mass tort cases would not satisfy the Rule 23
requirements because as the "Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule
23 ... noted ... 'mass accident' cases are likely to present 'significant questions,
not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, ... affecting the
individuals in different ways'") (omission in original).
22 . !d.
23. !d. ("Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging
consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitmst laws.") (emphasis
added).
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The requirements of Rule 23 fit those facts like a glove.24
The plaintiffs are all in essentially the same position: they purchased
securities whose market prices were inflated, to an identical extent,
by a single misrepresentation (commonality). Each plaintiff, in an
individual suit, would be seeking to prove facts that would entitle the
others to recover (typicality and adequacy). The common issues
would encompass almost all the elements of the Rule 1Ob-5 cause of
action-materiality, scienter, causation, and injury, with materiality
doing double-duty as reliance under Basic-and would predominate
over whatever individual issues exist. 25 Finally, because small
investors with little at stake might not be able to attract plainti±Is'
lawyers if forced to proceed individually, the superiority of the class
action form is evident.
However, the fact that a particular, idealized securities fraud
case is suitable for class treatment does not mean that all, or even
most, are. The hold that this paradigm case exerts over the legal
imagination is regrettable, because many securities fraud cases differ
in crucial respects. They do not involve single misrepresentations or
disclosures, and sometimes the representations do not relate to the
underlying value of a security. They feature long time periods and
ambiguous price movements, and the purchasers include large
institutions as well as small investors. The following Part discusses
the ways in which the facts of securities fraud cases may depart from
the paradigm sketched above and the implications of those
departures for the certification requirements.

Ill.

PARADIGMS LOST: COMPLICATIONS

Actual allegations of securities fraud may differ from the
paradigm case in several ways, complicating matters for plaintiffs
seeking class certification.
A.

Long Class Periods

As class periods grow longer, the efficacy of a plaintiffs
invocation of the fraud-on-the-market theory decreases. In the Rule
1Ob-5 context, the theory essentially works by substituting a

24. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes.
25. !d.
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materiality analysis for what would otherwise be an individualized
inquiry into reliance: if the misrepresentation was materi al, then it
affected the market price, and plaintiffs relying on the integrity of the
market price may be deemed to have relied on the
misrepresentation? 6 It is impmiant to realize, however, that the
commonality thus created exists only for plaintiffs purchasing at the
same time. vVhether a misrepresentation is material depends on how
it affects the "total mix" of information available to an investor; 27 as
the total mix of information changes over time, so too does the
materi ality analysis. Publicly-held corporations issue earnings
statements and press releases; they file SEC di sclosure forms and are
the subject of analyst reports. Information about the economy in
general, or the prospects of an industry or sector, also affects a
company's value. Because the total mix of information available is
constantly changing, it will frequently be impossible to establish
materiality by common proof. A misrepresentation that was material
when made may soon become immaterial as it is overtaken by a
welter of new information coming to the marketplace.28
B.

lvfultiple Misrepresentations or Disclosures

In particular, as class periods grow longer, the chances
increase that the case will feature either multiple misrepresentations
or multiple corrective disclosures. Multiple misrepresentations or
disclosures not only complicate the materiality and reliance analyses,
as discussed above; they also create the potential for conflicts
between class members. Each plaintiff can maximize his recovery
by showing that the price of the security was inflated when he
29
purchased it, but not when he sold it. Because class members buy
and sell from each other, they will have opposite incentives with
regard to proof of price inflation; each will want to stress the

26. See, e.g., Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F.Supp. 254, 258 (D.C. Ill. 1981).
27 . See TSC Indus., Inc v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
28 . See, e.g., J.H. Cohn & Co. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs. , Inc., 628 F.2d 994,
998 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that an early purchaser "would face a different question
of proof on the materiality issue" than one who purchased "after a great deal more
information ... was available"); Gelman v. Westinghouse Corp., 73 F.R.D. 60, 68
(W.D. Pa. 1976) ("[T]he question of materiality as it pertains to the claim of a
shareholder who sold stock in May or June is vastly different from the question as it
pertains to claims stemming from sales in November or December."), aff'd, 612 F.2d
799 (3d Cir. 1980).
29. See, e.g., Greene v. Emersons Ltd., 86 F.R.D. 47, 61-62 (D.C.N.Y. 198 0).

,,.
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importance of misrepresentations occurring before his purchase and
of disclosures occurring before his sale while downplaying the
significance of others. This conflict threatens the adequacy of any
single class representative. 30
The existence of multiple
misrepresentations or disclosures also dramatically increases the
magnitude and complexity of the proceedings necessary to establish
31
materiality and loss causation and to calculate damages.

C.

Atypical or Nonpublic Misrepresentations

In some cases, the misrepresentations on which plaintiffs
base their Rule 1Ob-5 claim will either not relate directly to the value
of the underlying security or will be made to individual investors
32
rather than disseminated to the public.
Either of these features can
prevent plaintiffs from using the fraud-on-the-market theory to
establish materiality, reliance, or fact of injury. Plaintiffs who
cannot rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory face an uphill battle in
seeking certification. There are few other ways to establish these
elements by common proof, and the need for individualized analysis
of even one element of the cause of action may preclude a finding of
33
predominance or make a trial unmanageable.
- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

30. See, e.g., Ziemack v. Centel Corp., 163 F.R.D. 530, 540-42 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(discussing conflict between securities fraud class members who bought and sold at
different times); In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1358-62
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (examining conflicts in litigation between those that bought and
sold on different days and those that still hold some of the relevant securities); Ballan
v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 482-85 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (discussing "the conflict
between sellers and purchasers of the subclass periods"). See generally David J.
Ross, Do Conflicts Between Class Members Vitiate Class Action Securities Fraud
Suits?, 70 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 209 (1996) (discussing both "seller-purchaser conflict"
and "equity conflict").
31. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1358-59
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that because antagonism over price inflation, for
example, implicates the damages, reliance, materiality, and proximate cause
elements, it is "heart of the suit").
32. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that fraud-on-the-market doctrine and its presumption of reliance upon
misstatements were inapplicable in a securities fraud class action against securities
brokerage firm for stockbroker's allegedly false statements to several clients that a
particular corporation was certain to be acquired at premium in near future).
3 3. As discussed in greater detail in Part III, the atypicality of the alleged
misrepresentation was enough to preclude certification in Newton v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2001). See also, e.g.,
Prudential, 282 F.3d at 938 (refusing to allow plaintiffs to invoke fraud-on-the-
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Differences Among Investors

While the paradigm case assumes a large number of
homogenous small investors, the truth is that large institutional
investors own a substantial and increasing percentage of securities.
Sixty years ago, Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield argued for
the appropriateness of class actions in cases in which many
individuals have "a small stake in a large controversy" and mi ght be
unwilling to proceed on an individual basis. 34 That may once have
been an apt description of securities fraud cases; in 1950,
institutional investors held only 7.2% of outstanding e~uities. 35
However, by 1997 that proportion had increased to 46.7%. 3 Many,
if not most, securities fraud cases now count large institutions, with
large holdings of the stock at issue, among the potential plaintiffsinstitutions such as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and
large corporations with the resources and economic incentives to
pursue individual claims. 37
The presence of institutional investors not only undermines
one of the policy bases for class treatment, it also destroys the
uniformity among plaintiffs presumed by the paradigm case.
Institutional investors are more sophisticated than the average

market based on nonpublic misrepresentations); In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242
F.3d 136, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2001) (fmding no predominance in fraud case based on
numerous non-uniform "sales pitches" for annuity contracts); Baum v. Great W.
Cities, Inc., of N.M., 703 F.2d 1197, 1210 (lOth Cir. 1983) (affmning the district
court's ruling not to certify the case as a class action because individual issues of
reliance and limitations might prevent common issues from predominating); Simon
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1973)
(stating that a class should not be certified when individual problems predominate
over questions of law and fact common to all).
34. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of
the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 ( 1941 ).
35. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 2001 FACT BOOK 61-62, available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/200 1_factbook_ 06.pdf.
36. /d.
37. See Dan Cordtz, Private Attorney General, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus.
REv., Sept. 10, 2001, at 8 (stating that institutional investors like pension funds are
increasingly taking the lead in securities class action certifications); see also Paul
Elias, Locals Lose Out in McKesson Case, SAN FRANCISCO RECORDER, Dec. 30,
1999, at 1 (noting the choice of the New York State Common Retirement Fund to
serve as lead plaintiff in stock fraud suit); Michael A. Riccardi, Judge Calls for
Competitive Bids to Hire Securities Counsel, Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 5, 1998, at
1 (reporting four large pension funds selection to be co-lead plaintiffs in a
securities fraud class action).
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individual investor, and differing sophistication may destroy
commonality on several Rule 1Ob-5 issues. The materiality analysis
depends on the sophistication of a plainti±T, 38 as does the assessment
of reasonable reliance 39 and the application of the Securities Act's
tolling provision. 40 The presence of institutional investors within the
plaintiff class will prevent resolution of these issues by common
proof and undermine the predominance of common issues.
Another distinct class of investors is short sellers, who sell
shares of stock they do not own in anticipation that the price will
decline. 41 Short sellers may fall within a class definition based on
sale, or even one based on purchase, as they buy stock to cover their
short positions. 42 However, to say that a short seller relies on the
integrity of the market price is a stretch; traders short-sell stocks
precisely because they believe the market overestimates their true
value.
More significantly, a trader who knew that a
misrepresentation was inflating a security's price would be more (not
less) likely to execute his short sale, so proving transaction causation
is all but impossible. Finally, short sellers are unlikely to have been
injured. Inclusion of short sellers in a class can thus prevent
plaintiffs from establishing materiality, reliance, or fact of injury
43
with common proof, threatening predominance.

38. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976)
(fmding no materiality when a plaintiff acting with "due care" should have known
the relevant facts, taking into account the plaintiff's "sophistication" and "access to
the relevant information").
39. See Brown v. E.F. Hutton, 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
when an investor acts recklessly there is not justifiable reliance).
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994 & West Supp. 2002).
See Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 834 F.2d 523, 528 (5th
Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that the two-year statute oflirnitations does not begin to
run until "the aggrieved party has either actual knowledge of the violation or
notice of facts which, in the exercise of due diligence, would have led to actual
knowledge thereof').
41. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1379 (6th ed. 1990) (defming "short
sale").
42. See Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir.
1995) (defming a "short sale" to be a "sale at a price fixed now for delivery later").
43. See Ganesh v. Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 487, 490 (E.D.
Va. 1998) ("Short-sellers arguably lack standing to avail themselves of the
securities laws, both because they effectively sold their stock before they
purchased it and because, unlike the traditional investor who hopes to profit from
the company's good fortune, they seek to gain from the company's decline.") .
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Frankenstein 's 1\fonsters

As the facts of a securities fraud case depart from the
certification paradigm, it becomes less possible to establish the
elements of the claim by common proof. This makes it more likely,
fro m the Rule 23(b)(3) perspective, that individual issues will be
found to predominate.44
However, it has additional legal
significance, especially in the larger cases, for the superiority
requirement.
Rule 23(b )(3) requires a would-be class representative to
show "that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy," and the rule
explicitly instructs courts to consider "the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action." 45
These
difficulties are seldom faced because of the frequency with which
securities fraud class actions are settled before trial. However, the
fact that a case is likely to be settled if a class is certified 46 does not
mean that the difficulties of trying the case can be ignored in the
certification calculus (unless, of course, the class presented for
certification is a settlement class), as the Supreme Court made clear
. A me h em. 47
m
Consequently, departures from the paradigm case can take on
an added significance. Even if they are insufficient to lead the court
to conclude that common issues predominate, the practical burdens
of performing even a brief individualized analysis for every member
of a large class may overwhelm the trial system's resources. As the
Ninth Circuit stated, "[I]t cannot be lightly overlooked that as a class
gets larger it may transform a litigation into a gigantic burden on the
44. FED. R. CIV. P . 23(b)(3).
45 . !d.
46. See supra note 17. That a large class has substantial in terrorem potential is
not an unmitigated good for plaintiffs. Federal courts are growing more sensitive to
the coercive aspects of certification and may be less likely to certify a class that
threatens such massive liability as to make a metits defense unthinkable. See
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc ., 259 F.3d 154, 167 n.8 (3d
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he size of the class and number of claims may place acute and
unwarranted pressure on defendants to settle. It is a factor we weigh m our
certification calculus.").
47. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)
("Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court
need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management
problems."). Moreover, the more coercive the certification, the greater the likelihood
ofRule 23(f) review. FED. R. CN. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1998).

1
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Court's resources beyond its capacity to manage or effectively
control." 48 For very large classes, the demands of an actual trial can
approach the absurd. In one case, the court estimated that actual trial
of individual damage claims would require "well over one hundred
years." 49 At that point, the class action can no longer be called a
superior form of resolution, and the case becomes what the Supreme
Court has described as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a class
. ,,so
actwn.-

F.

Non-JOb-5 Claims

While the general proscription of Rule 1Ob-5 dominates the
popular imagination, securities fraud plaintiffs may also bring suit
51
under other sections of the Act, notably Sections 11 and 12(a)(2).
In addition to the complications discussed above, these sections
present their own difficulties for a plaintiff seeking class
certification.
Section 11 imposes liability on certain enumerated parties for
52
It requires
misstatements or omissions in registration statements.
plaintiffs to make two showings that frequently cannot be achieved
with common proof. First, while there is currently a split of
authority over whether its cause of action extends to plaintiffs who
purchased in the secondary market rather than in an initial public
offering, 5 3 it is agreed that plaintiffs must in any case be able to show
that the stock they purchased was issued pursuant to the allegedly

48. In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting Morris
v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
49. Galloway v. Am. Brands, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 580, 586 (E.D.N.C. 1978). The
claims in Galloway were antitrust claims, but similar principles govern securities
fraud cases. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 (11th
Cir. 1987) (fmding that a large class was appropriate in a securities fraud action only
because the common questions predominated need for individual treatments) . Also,
damage is an element of the 1Ob-5 cause of action, just as it is with the Sherman Act.
In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 81-88 (E.D.N.Y.
2000).
50. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 169 (1974).
51. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C . 77k, 77l(a)(2) (1994 &
West Supp. 2002).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
53. Compare WRT Energy Sec. Litig., 1997 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1[ 99,560
(S .D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing suit only by initial public offering purchasers), with
Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1161 (lOth Cir. 2000) (allowing suit by aftermarket
purchasers).
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54

defective registration statement. Second, while Section 11 does not
generally require a plaintiff to show reliance, it does impose a
reliance requirement on any plaintiff who purchases the security
after the issuer has made available an earnings statement covering a
period of twelve months after the registration statement. 5 5
Section 12(a)(2) allows purchasers of securities sold on the
basis of a false or misleading prospectus, or false or misleading oral
56
It applies only to purchasers in
statements, to sue their sellers.
57
Section 12(a)(2), like Section 11 , grants
initial public offerings.
defendants affirmativ e defenses that may require individual
58
analysis.
First, both sections allow defendants to avoid or reduce
liability by showing that all or part of the decline in the value of a
security is due to factors other than the alleged misrepresentation or
59
omission.
Second, both sections preclude recovery by any person
who actually knew of the alleged misrepresentation at the time of
6
purchase. Finally, both sections are subject to the general Section
13 limitations period, which may require individualized assessments
61
of diligence. In addition, the equitable basis of the Section 12(a)(2)
rescission remedy has led courts to impose a promptness requirement
62
akin to a laches defense.
However, the "class action format is not
suitable for the individualized treatment required for the exercise of
. bl e powers. ,63
eqmta

°

G.

Atypical Lead Plaintiffs

Defeating certification by showing the atypicality of a named
plaintiff is usually only a temporary victory, as the class may just
54. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271-73 (2d Cir. 1967) (approving an
action maintained only by one who purchased the securities directly subject to the
registration statement).
55. 15 U.S .C. § 77k.
56. 15 U.S .C. § 77/(a)(2).
57. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 582-84 (1995) (stating that
claims may only arise out of initial sale offerings and not private sale agreements).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77/(b).
59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77/(b).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 77/(a)(2).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994 & West Supp. 2002).
62. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. '21' Int'l Holdings, Inc. , 821 F.
Supp. 212, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[P]Iaintiffs must make a prompt demand for
rescission in order to ... obtain ... damages under§ 12(2).").
63. McDonald v. Pension Plan of NYSA-ILA Pension Trus t Fund, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 268, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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return with another representative. 64 Nonetheless, it is worth
considering, because a typicality challenge may fare well against
"professional plaintiffs." A plaintiff who has purchased stock simply
to bring a lawsuit demonstrably did not rely on the integrity of the
market price and thus is subject to a defense not applicable to the rest
65
of the class, a disqualifying atypicality.

IV.

APPLICATIONS:

& SMITH, INC.

NEWTON V.lv!ERRILL L YNCH, PIERCE, FENNER

66

In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
("Newton IF'), the Third Circuit encountered a putative class action
that differed significantly from the paradigm case. 67 The named
plaintiff sought to represent a class of investors who purchased and
sold securities on the NASDAQ market between November 4, 1992
and August 28, 1996. 68 The defendants were the broker-dealers who
had executed the plaintiffs' orders. The theory of liability was that
the broker-dealers had violated their duty of best execution by
executing the investors' orders at the price offered by the National
Best Bid and Offer system (NBBO) without consulting alternative
sources of liquidity such as SelectNet or Instinet (private on-line
services). 69 Failure to disclose the alleged breach of duty leveraged
the common law tort into a Rule lOb-5 claim. 70
64 . See, e.g. , Alinda v. Penton Media, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365
(S.D .N.T. 2001) (stating that Congress did not intend to "preclude intervention and
certification of non-leading plaintiffs when previously appointed lead plaintiffs
have been disqualified").
65. See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992)
("(C]lass certification should not be granted if 'there is a danger that absent class
members will suffer if their representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to
it.'") (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990).
66 . 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Newton If').
67 . !d. at 162.
68. !d. at 169.
69 . !d. at 162. For a detailed description of these alternative sources, see the
district court opinion granting summary judgment to defendants. In re Merrill
Lynch Sec . Litig., 911 F. Supp. 754,759-60 (D.N.J. 1995), rev'd en bane, Newton
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 135 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 1998)

("Newton F').
70. See In re Merrill Lynch Sec . Litig., 911 F. Supp . at 768 ("(T]he Federal
securities statutes were modeled after the common law actions of fraud and
deceit.").
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The defendants initially prevailed before the district court on
the theory that the duty of best execution was not sufficiently welldefined during the class period for the plaintiffs to establish either
71
A divided panel of the Third Circuit
materiality or scienter.
affirmed, but the court en bane revers ed, holding that when better
prices were reasonably available, NBBO execution might be a
breach of the duty of best execution, and failure to disclose the
practice of not consulting alternate sources might be a Rule 1Ob-5
. 1atlon.
. 72
v1o
That clarification of the potential liability set the stage for the
district court's class certification decision. The defendants had,
according to the complaint, engaged in a uniform course of conduct
that might in some circumstances amount to a violation of Rule 1Ob5. Was that common conduct enough to support certification under
Rule 23(b)(3)? Judge Debevoise answered in the negative and the
73
plaintiffs appealed.
The plaintiffs ' central theme on appeal was the defendants'
common conduct. Every proposed class member, they argued, had
been treated identically, and this "common scheme" made class
74
treatment appropriate. Not so, the defendants replied: Determining
whether a better price was available for any particular trade, and
whether that plaintiff would have wanted a broker-dealer to spend
the time to look for it, would require consideration of the particular
circumstances of every plaintiffs every trade-individualized issues
that would predominate over common ones and overwhelm any
75
court' s factfinding ability.
The facts of Newton parted company with the paradigm case
on one central point. The alleged misrepresentations or omissions
had no connection to the underlying value of any security, relating
76
instead to the manner in which orders were executed.
The Third
77
Circuit began its analysis with this observation and went on to

71. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 171.
72. See id. (discussing en bane holding).
73. !d.
74. See id. ("[Plaintiffs] claim this 'common scheme' provides a uniform
course of unlawful conduct well-suited for adjudication as a class action.").
75. See id. at 172 (detailing defendants' argument against class certification).
76. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 173.
77. See id. ("It is important to recognize that the facts of this case do not
resonate with those typical of securities violations under Rule 10b-5. Customarily
those claims involve a fraudulent material misrepresentation or omission that affects
a security's value.").
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demonstrate how one di vergence from the paradigm may be enough
. 78
to b ar certl.fi1catwn.
The defendants argued that each of the elements of a 1Ob-5
79
cause of action would require individualized analysis.
The Thi rd
Circuit found the materiality issue decided by its en bane holding
that a broker-dealer who accepted a customer's order "while
intending to breach that duty [of best execution] m akes a
misrepresentation that is material." 80 With respect to reliance, it
found that the atypical nature of the misrepresentations (their lack of
connection to the underlying value of any security) prevented th e
plaintiffs from using the fraud-on-the-market theory to create a
presumption of reliance. 81 As a consolation prize, the court gave the
plaintiffs a rebuttable presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 82 which allows such a presumption
with regard to omissions on the grounds that it is unfair to require a
plaintiff to prove reliance on an omission. 83 The Affiliated Ute
presumption is a poor substitute for fraud-on-the-market, however,
since the defendant's ability to rebut on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis
tends to shift reliance out of the "common" column and into the
"individual." 84 With respect to the fact of injury, the unavailability
of the fraud-on-the-market theory likewise prevented plaintiffs from

78. See id. at 182-83 (discussing the commonality requirement for class
certification).
79. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266,
269 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Newton f').
80. !d. This analysis of the materiality issue seems obvious-an intent to
breach the duty of best execution certainly sounds material- but on the facts of
Newton it is questionable. The form the alleged breach took was automatic NBBO
execution, and some investors (those who anticipated a rapid price increase)
presumably would have preferred the speed of that execution to the delay required to
scour the Internet for alternate sources of liquidity. Newton If, 259 F.3d at 176-78.
Moreover, some of the plaintiffs were sophisticated institutional investors who were
quite aware ofboth the defendants' practice ofNBBO execution and the existence of
alternatives. !d.
81. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 175-76.
82. 406 U.S. 128 (1970).
83. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 174-75 (discussing the "most reasonable
placement of the burden of proof of reliance").
84. See id. at 176-80 (discussing the possible unavailability of a presumption of
reliance). In Newton II, that rebuttal would have taken the form of showing that a
particular plaintiff either valued speed of execution over the potential for lower
prices, or was indifferent, or that the plaintiff knew of defendants ' practice and the
possible alternatives-precisely the same possibilities the cowi erroneously ignored
in supposing that materiality presented a cornn1on issue.

Spring 2003]

SECURITIES FRA UD

421

establishing this element via common proof 85 \tVhether an investor
had suffered the injury necessary for a Rule 1Ob-5 claim dep ended
on whether a better alternative price was in fac t available and
whether the investor would have wanted his broker to spend the time
86
These requirements obviously raised
needed to look for it.
87
individualized questions.
With fact of injury requiring a trad e-b y-trade analysis and
reliance subject to plaintiff-by-plaintiff rebuttal,88 the court found
that individual issues predominated, plaintiffs' invocation of the
89
Arnchem dictum notwithstanding.
The need to " [e]xamin[ e]
millions of trades to ascertain whether or not there was injury ...
.
,90
overw h e1me d common ques t wns ....
The plaintiffs proposed to "gloss over this requirement" by
developing a statistical formula that would calculate aggregate
damages and then allocate them among class members. 9 1 Such a
suggestion, the court observed, would allow the plaintiffs to
substitute a statistical calculation of damages for the proof of
individual injury that the Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action requires. 92 That
suggestion would allow plaintiffs to dispense with proof of one
element of their claim, a substantive alteration of rights forbidden by
the Rules Enabling Act. 93
Predominance aside, the court also found that determining
whether each plaintiff had been injured and evaluating the individual
defenses that could be raised was simply too massive and complex a
94
Trial of the proposed class would require examination of
task.
"hundreds of millions of transactions executed over several years"; it
would simply be unmanageable, indeed flatly impossible, without a
lot of impermissible shortcuts. 95
85. !d. at 179-80.
86. !d. at 178.
87. See id. at 177-81.
88. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 181.
89. See id. at 189 (noting plaintiffs' citation of Amchem).
90. !d. at 187.
91. !d. at 187-88.
92. See id. at 187-90 (asserting that damage calculations do not exempt plaintiff
from proving injury).
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (stating that rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right").
94. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192 (" [E]stablishing proof of plaintiffs '
injuries and litigating the defenses available to defendants would present
insurmountable manageab ility problems for the district court.").
95. See id. at 191-92.
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Newton 11 holds important lessons for securities fraud defense
counsel with regard to both of the grounds on which it was decided.
Its predominance analysis demonstrates that w hen the effect of a
common course of conduct depends on characteristics of the
individual plaintiff or the individual transaction, the m ere fact of
common conduct is not enough. 96 Securities fraud or not, the alleged
offense becomes conceptually similar to a m ass tmi, and class
certification is inappropriate for the same reasons that apply to mass
torts. 97 Newton IFs superiority analysis shows that as a proposed
class grows larger, it becomes more vulnerabl e to m anageability
challenges. 98 Even if injury could have been presumed, the task of
calculating damages for each plaintiff "would require hundreds of
99
millions of individual assessments," something no court could
do. 100 Even a single individualized inquiry may thus be enough to
bring down a truly massive class; as the Fourth Circuit has put it,
" where the issue of damages and impact does not lend itself to ... a
mechanical calculation, but requires ' separate mini-tri al[s]' of an
overwhelming[ly] large number of individual claims, courts have
found that the 'staggering problems of logistics ' thus created ' m ake

96. See id. at 189 (observing "the huge number of important individualized
issues" that overwhelm any common questions).
97. !d. at 189-90 (noting similarity to mass tort cases).
98. See id. at 192 (explaining that the surperiority requirement casts "serious
doubt" on the manageability of certifying the class for trial).
99 . Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192.
100. Bifurcating the trial into a liab ility phase and a damages phase is often
suggested as a solution to the problem of calculating damages. See, e.g., Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 58 (1991). Bifurcation can raise serious
constitutional issues, however, because liability and damages issues often intertwine.
See, e.g., In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1114, 1182
(stating that "Seventh Amendment problems are inherent when separate juries
determine facts of damage and amount of damages"). Therefore, the Seventh
Amendment, which forbids one jury from reviewing another's conclusions, is
implicated. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co. , 84 F.3d 734, 750-51 (5th
Cir. 1996) (citing bifurcation as a factor weighing heavily against certification where
individual issues, such as comparative negligence, were intertwined with common
issues). The danger is especially acute with regard to claims (like those under Rule
10b-5) for which actual injury is an element of the cause of action. Any damagesphase jury determination that a plaintiff's damages are zero will contradict the
liability-phase fmding of injury. See In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust
Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1184 (3d Cir. 1993) (reversing damages verdict handed down
following a bifurcated antitrust trial because the jury may have reconsidered fact of
injury in determining amount of damages).
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the damage aspect of [theJ case predominate,' and rend er the case
.
,10 1
unmanageabl e as a c1ass ac t 10n.
Newton II also provides a useful reminder that plaintiffs
cannot make it past the certification stage merely by invoking the
102
To overcome the di ffi culties inherent in
authority of an expert.
examining each and every trade to determine whether individual
plaintiffs suffered injury, the plaintiffs offered their expert's
assertion that "a reliable measure of damages can be developed in
this case based on the application of well-established statistical
techniques." 103 The Third Circuit correctly refused to accept the
offer: the proposed statistical proof would not have proved that each
plaintiff had in fact suffered an actual injury, and what the plaintiffs
proposed was essentially to overcome the predominance problem by
eliding an element of the Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action. 104
From one perspective, the Third Circuit's treatment of the
proffered statistical analysis is easily recognizable as conventional
Rule 23(b) predominance analysis. The defendants claimed that the
fact of injury would require individualized analysis, and the plaintiffs
failed to establish that they could demonstrate injury by common
proof. 105 From another perspective, however, it appears to venture
into the merits of the case. The plaintiffs offered expert testimony to
prove both fact and amount of damages, and the court held that
106
Yet it is one of the most familiar
testimony insufficient.
aphorisms of class action law that "nothing in either the language or
the history of Rule 23 ... gives a court any authority to conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine
whether it may be maintained as a class action." 107
The fact that an analysis of plaintiffs' ability to satisfy the
demands of Rule 23(b)(3) with expert testimony may resemble an
inquiry into the merits of the case has caused courts some difficulty.

101. Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc ., 565 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir. 1977). Also
encouraging for defense counsel is the recognition of the Newton II court that
certification of an unusually large class "would place hydraulic pressure on
defendants to settle which weighs in the superiority analysis." Newton II, 259 F.3d
at 192. This suggests that large classes may, apart from other defects, sometimes
simply fall of their own weight.
102. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 182 (listing requirements for certification) .
103. !d. at 188 n.33.
104. See id. at 187-90.
105 . Id. at 188-89 .
106. !d. at 188.
107. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
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opinion,
In its In re Visa Check/lv!as termon ey Antitrust Litigation
the Second Circuit, over a strong diss ent, invoked the Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacqu elin 109 principle in support of a very limited role for
courts in assessing expert testimony at the certification stage: "a
district court may not weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in
' statistical dueling ' of experts." 110 This statement is correct in a
certain limited sense. A court should not refuse to certify a class
simply because it believes that the plaintiffs will not be able to make
good on the factual allegations in their complaint, and to this extent
merits questions are irrelevant to the certification decision. 111
However, it is simply not true that a district court is barred from
weighing evidence or assessing competing testimony when doing so
is necessary to a Rule 23 analysis. 112 ·w hat Eisen forbids is a
"preliminary inquiry into the merits," not the resolution of a merits
issue in the course of a certification decision. 113 The In re Visa
Check/Mastermoney court may have confused these two concepts.
As Judge Jacobs pointed out in his dissent, the challenged expert
testimony related to the measure of damages, and the determination
of which measure of damages should apply was "critical to the class
certification motion" because one of the candidates created
"intractable conflict" between class members. 114
Like the Newton II court, the Seventh Circuit recently
recognized that the analysis prescribed by Rule 23 must be
scrupulously performed, even if it overlaps with the merits. In West
v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 115 it refused to allow certification
based on uncritical acceptance of an expert's testimony, holding that
such deferential treatment "amounts to a delegation of judicial power
to the plaintiffs, who can obtain class certification just by hiring a
competent expert." 116 The Prudential plaintiffs sought to use the
fraud-on-the-market theory to allow all purchasers of a particular
stock to recover for alleged misstatements that were made by a
single broker to a small number of clients, and never publicly
108. 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001).
109. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) .
110. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney, 280 F.3d at 135.
111. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.
112. !d.; West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
113. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.
114. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney, 280 F.3d at 155, 158 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).
115. West v. Prudential Sec., Inc ., 282 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2002)
116. !d. at 938.
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A "reputable financial economist" provided expert
disseminated.
support for the plaintiffs' theory, and the district court certified the
118
11 9
The Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the
class.
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory to nonpublic
misrepresentations was a significant extension, and the fact that
plaintiffs produced competent expert testimony as some suppmi for
their th eory was not enough to satisfy the demands of Rule 23. 120
Engaging in an independent review of the record, Judge Easterbrook
held that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that nonpubli c
information affected the price of the stock at issue, a fatal defect. 121
Like Newton II, Prudential is, from one perspective, a
conventional certification decision. The plaintiffs failed to show that
122
Of course,
they could establish causation by common proof.
Judge Easterbrook's decision on that point was bound up with the
merits; the plaintiffs failed because their evidence did not
demonstrate causation at all, even though their expert opined that it
123
Prudential and Newton II conectly recognize that plaintiffs
did.
cannot insulate a certification motion from scrutiny by wrapping it in
124
Critical evaluation of an expert's opinion as to
expert testimony.
what conclusions the evidence supports will frequently bring courts
close upon the merits, but it is no more than Rule 23 demands. 125 An
expert who testifies, for example, that every plaintiff has suffered
injury is in effect testifying that injury may be established by
common proof. However, the decision as to whether the elements of
a claim are susceptible to common proof is for the judge and may not
be handed off to experts. "A district judge may not," as Judge
Easterbrook held, "duck hard questions by observing that each side
has some support, or that considerations relevant to class
certification also may affect the decision on the merits. Tough

117. Id. at 936-37 .
118 . !d. at 938 .
119. Id.at940.
120. Prudential, 282 F.3d at 937.
121. !d. at 938-39.
122. !d. at 938.
123. !d.
124. !d.; Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d
154, 191 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Newton IF').
125. See, e.g. , Weisfeld v. Sun Chemical Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 143-44
(D.N.J. 2002) (concluding that plaintiffs expert witness could only show that the
antitrust injury impacted the class members and did not fulfill the requirement of
common proo( thereby fa ilin g to meet the requirements of Rule 23).
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questions must be faced and squarely decided, if necessary by
holding evidentiary hearings and choosing between competing
perspectives." 126 Rule 23 demands a rigorous analysis, and expert
testimony is no substitute for judicial decision-making.

V.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITY

The previous Parts have given an abstract description of
difficulties for securities fraud class action plaintiffs and have
examined a case study. This Part aims to offer resources for
defendants. Following are the most powerful arguments against
certification and citations to the most useful cases in support of those
arguments. The arguments and citations are grouped according to
the requirements of Rule 23.

A.

Typicality

A named plaintiff will fail to satisfy the typicality
127
requirement if he himself has no claim.
In Baffa v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 128 for example, the Second
126. Prudential, 282 F.3d at 938. One way of putting this is to say that class
certification is not summary judgment. A plaintiff can survive a summary
judgment motion merely by demonstrating contested issues of fact; the judge must
deny the motion even if he is skeptical about the plaintiffs ability ultimately to
prove his case. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675-76 (7th
Cir. 2001) (noting that a decision to certify under Rule 23 does not involve
accepting the plaintiffs' assertions as true, but that instead a judge must make
whatever factual or legal inquiries are necessary to allow the class action to
proceed). However, Rule 23 forbids agnosticism; it does not allow class
certification in the face of doubt as to whether the plaintiffs have made the
required showing. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) (explaining that the court must find
that "the questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members" before a class action will be maintained). Hence, is it not
enough (as the In re Visa Check/Mastermoney court apparently believed) for
plaintiffs to show '"a reasonable probability of establishing' [their] claims by
common proof'? In re Visa Check!Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124,
135 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 91
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)). The court must face the issue and decide whether common
proof is possible.
127. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(3) (discussing that one or more members of a
class may sue or be sued on behalf of all only if "the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of th e claims and defenses of the class").
128. 222 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Circuit affirmed the distri ct court ' s denial of certification on the
grounds that the plainti ffs lack of standing made him "an atypical
129
and inadequate representative."
Such plaintiffs apparently present
130
themselves with some frequency.
More commonly, however, the
named plaintiff will simply be subject to uniqu e defenses that might
distract from the common issues. As the Seventh Circuit put it, "The
presence of even an arguab le defense peculiar to the named plaintiff
or a small subset of the plaintiff class may destroy the required
. 1.1ty o f th e c1ass ." 13 1
typ1ca
B.

Adequacy

An adequacy challenge usually asserts that the interests of
class members are antagonistic. There are two sorts of pervasive
conflicts in securities fraud class actions that may threaten the
" undi vided loyalties to absent class members" that "basic due
132
.
p·1rst, there 1s
. se 11 er-purc h aser con fl 1ct:
.
process reqmres
."
c1ass
members all want to argue that the price was inflated when they
purchased, but not when they sold. Because a class member will
almost always have another class member as his counterparty in a

129. !d. at 58-59.
130. See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S . 395,
403-04 (1977) (holding that plaintiff had not suffered employment discrimination) ;
Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
plaintiffs claim was time-barred); McClain v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 105 F.3d 898, 903
(4th Cir. 1997) (stating that plaintiff had not paid allegedly illegal loan insurance
charges); Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 69 (8th Cir.
1980) (discussing the fact that, in securities fraud case, plaintiffs did not rely on
alleged misrepresentations); In re Am. Bank Note Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
93. F. Supp. 2d 424, 435 (S .D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that aftermarket purchasers could
not represent Securities Act§ 12(a)(2) class).
131. J.H. Cohn & Co. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 628 F.2d 994, 999 (7th
Cir. 1980); see also Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992)
(affmning denial of certification in securities case on typicality grounds because
named plaintiff was subject to unique defenses); Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990)
(denying a motion for class certification because class representative subject to
unique defenses); Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that sophisticated investor not a suitable class representative as subject to
peculiar defense); In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309
(S .D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that shareholder did not meet typicality requirement and
was not " most adequate" plaintiff).
132. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338 (4th
Cir. 1998).
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trade of class securities, there is inevitable conflict as, in order to
increase his own recovery, each class member will have an incentive
133
to minimize the harm suffered by counterparty class members.
The effect of such conflict can be quite substantial, and it increases
as class periods lengthen; in its most extreme fom1, it will present the
spectacle of a named plaintiff arguing that other class members are
entitled to no recovery at all, something that should give any court
pause. 134 Seller-purchaser conflict has prevented certification in
some cases, 135 but it has yet to be given its full due.
Second, there is arguably an "equity" conflict that occurs
when some class members still hold stock. These members will
want to reduce the recovery of other class members because recovery
136
against the corporation reduces the value of their stock holdings.

133. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.
1997) (exemplifying the conflict between class members).
134. See, e.g, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 228 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that proof that stock price was still inflated when class members sold
stock shows those members "would have no damages"); Robbins v. Koger Props.,
Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that when a stock price is still
inflated, plaintiffs have not suffered any damages).
135. See, e.g., Ziemack v. Centel Corp., 163 F.R.D. 530, 540-542 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (requiring plaintiffs to submit briefs on the issue of class representation due to
conflicts in liability and damages); In re Sea gate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp.
1341, 1359-62 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (fmding a class action unworkable because the
reconciliation of conflicts would require too many class representatives); Ballan v.
Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473,482-85 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (finding the plaintiff failed
to meet the minimum standard of lack of antagonism between his interest and those
of the class); Centurions v. Ferruzzi Trading Int'l, S.A., No. 89 C 7009, 1994 WL
114860, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 1993) (stating that plaintiffs did not show they were
adequate representatives of proposed class as they were in conflicting positions in
the market when they traded defendant's stock); Desimone v. Indus. Bio-Test Labs.,
Inc., 80 F.R.D. 112, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (denying class certification in part due to
the possibility that the plaintiffs claims were antagonistic to those of other class
members); Weisberg v. APL Corp., 76 F.R.D. 233, 239-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating
that plaintiff could only represent stockholders who exchanged shares during certain
time periods); Feldman v. Lifton, 64 F.R.D. 539, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (explaining
that investors who purchased early in the ten-year period and those who bought later
have interests that are antagonistic); Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 58 F.R.D. 436,
443 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that plaintiff may not adequately represent class
because he seeks to represent all purchasers of common stock but may not have
purchased from a named defendant).
136. See In re Mut. Sav. Bank Sec. Litig., 166 F.R.D. 377, 383-85 (E.D. Mich
1996) (discussing the conflict between "sellers" and "holders").

Spring 2003]

SECURITIES FRAUD

429

Equity conflict has thus far not posed much of an obstacle to class
. 137
cert1.fi1cat10n.
C.

Predominance

Plaintiffs seeking to establish materiality, reliance, loss
causation, and fact of injury by common proof rely critically on the
138
They also rely on it refl exively,
fraud-on-the-market theory.
invoking the theory in some cases in which it is not applicable, and it
is important to be ready to contest the assertion of a fraud on the
market. One way to do this is by demonstrating that the market at
issue is not efficient. 139 Another way is by demonstrating that the
security' s price failed to react in a manner consistent with a fraudon-the-market case, either not rising on the misrepresentations or not
falling on the subsequent disclosure of the truth. 140 Lack of
appropriate price movement can preclude reliance on the fraud-on141
the-market theory, or simply reduce recovery to zero.
Without a
fraud on the market, the individualized issue of reliance by itself is
142
usually sufficient to defeat certification.

137. Beyond the cases cited in note 135, supra, some of which also discuss
equity conflict, perhaps the best treatment is Ruggiero v. Am. Bioculture, Inc., 56
F.R.D. 93, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
138 . See, e.g., In re Honeywell Int'l. Inc ., Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 00-3605
(DRD), 2002 WL 31525571, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2002) (discussing class
certification and ability to take advantage of fraud-on-the-market theory).
139. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing a market efficiency defense is available against a fraud-on-the-market
claim), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S . 914 (1989).
More broadly, the efficient market hypothesis itself has come under fire recently as
the growing school of"behaviorallaw and economics" seeks sacred cows to tip over.
See generally Paul A. Ferrillo & Michael K. Rappaport, 'Sunbeam ' Warms Market
Efficiency Arguments, N .Y. L.J., Oct. 24, 2001, at 8 (questioning the truth of the
presumption that investors behave rationally).
140. See, e.g., Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 414-15 (5th Cir.
2001) (noting that the information in question did not affect stock price).
141. See, e.g., id. at 414 ("It is clear that a fraud-on-the-market theory may not
be the basis for recovery in respect to an alleged misrepresentation which does not
affect the market price of the security in question."); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If, for example, a firm reveals that an
earlier public statement was mistaken, but the price of the securities does not move
in response, the investors suffer no damages.").
142. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Corp. , 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir.
1996) ("[A] fraud class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an
issue.").
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It is also important to recognize the limitations of the fraudon-the-market theory.
The theory essenti ally consoiidates the
disparate plaintiffs into a single group-the market-and us es that
measure of aggregate response as a substitute for individual proof. 143
If the misrepresentations moved the market price up, the y were
material; if the subsequent disclosure of the truth moved the price
down, plaintiffs were injured. 144 However, the commonality thus
created exists for particular moments only, and the investors
comprising the market are an ever-changing assemblage. Investors
do not all buy and sell simultaneously, and the fraud-on-the-market
theory does not create commonality between investors trading at
different times. 145 An extended class period and the existence of
multiple misrepresentations or corrective disclosures may prevent
plaintiffs from establishing materiality or reliance by common proof
even if they can use the fraud-on-the-m arket theory. 146
Loss causation and fact of injury throw the theory ' s
limitations into even sharper relief. Not only can plaintiffs who
bought and sold at different times not rely on common proof to show
that the market price was inflated as a result of defendant's
misrepresentations when they purchased and not when they sold, but
they also do not even have common aims. 147 Instead, the class
members are pitted against other class members, each trying to
establish contradictory theories about when inflation existed, when it
dissipated, and what caused it. 148 Beyond the adequacy issues thus
presented, this sort of individualized analysis can be tremendously
complex.
Nor does fraud-on-the-market necessarily even allow
plaintiffs to establish reliance by common proof. Reliance, after all,

143. See, e.g., In re Firstplus Fin. Group, Inc ., Sec. Litig., No. Civ.A.3:98CV-2551-M, 2002 WL 31415951, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Oct 28, 2002) (noting
individual class members' reliance is not necessary).
144. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating
that where plaintiffs prove material misrepresentations and an open and developed
market, the court will presume that misrepresentation increased the value and
induced purchase).
145. See, e.g., In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig. , 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 299
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting "the un availability of the fraud-on-the-market theory to
create commonality").
146. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 28.
147. See, e.g., Seidman v. Am. Mobile Sys., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 354, 360 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (noting the questions for which plaintiffs could rely on common proof).
148 . See, e.g., id.
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"is not enough by itself; that reliance must be justifiable, or
reasonable." 149
Because reasonableness depends on the
characteristics of an investor and the other information available to
him, fraud-on-the-market may not even create commonality for
15
plaintiffs purchasing at the same time. ° Fraud-on-the-market, m
short, is no panacea for the class action proponent.
D.

Superiority

The superiority determination frequently comes down to the
question of whether trial of the contemplated class action would be
manageable. 151 Manageability, in tum, is in large part a function of
two variables: the number of class members or transactions that must
be examined and the complexity of the analysis that must be
1-2
performed for each. )
As classes grow larger, the number of
required determinations can climb into the millions, and even routine
inquiries can create insuperable manageability problems.
If
calculating a class member's damages requires fifteen minutes, for
example (an optimistic estimate in most securities fraud cases, given
the need to quantify inflation and show a causal link to the
defendant's misrepresentations), and there are twenty million trades
during the class period, a court working eight hours a day for five
days a week will be done in slightly over 2,403 years.
149. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Harrison
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 77 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 1996)).
150. In particular, sophisticated investors are held to higher standards with
regard to reasonable reliance. See In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F.
Supp. 2d 371, 439 (S .D.N.Y. 2001). See generally Brown v. E.F. Hutton, 991 F.2d
1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing reasonableness standards).
A similar
requirement has been imposed in some cases with respect to materiality. See Straub
v. Yaisman & Co. , 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976) (fmding no materiality
when a plaintiff acting with "due care" should have known the relevant facts, taking
into account plaintiffs "sophistication" and "access to relevant information") .
151. "Contemplated" recognizes that the district court must consider the
possibility, even if it is clear that certification will, as a practical matter, lead to
settlement and not trial. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600
(1997) (stating that "a class action may be certified for settlement purposes only,
[but] Rule 23(a)'s requirements must be satisfied . . . "); cf Kline v. Coldwell,
Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concurring) ("I
doubt that plaintiffs' counsel expect the immense and unmanageable case that they
seek to create to be tried. What they seek will become . .. an overwhelmingly costly
and potent engine for the compulsion of settlements, whether just or unjust.") .
152. See, e.g., Upshaw v. Ga. Catalog Sales, Inc ., 206 F .R.D . 694, 696 (M.D.
Ga. 2002) (describing manageability and its interaction with superiority).
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Recognizing the problems with multi-thousand-year
proceedings, plaintiffs typically seek to simplify things by using two
devices: bifurcating tri als into liability and damages phases, 153 and
154
using statistical methods to calculate damages.
The first can be
opposed on the theory that liability and damages issues will overlap
and bifurcation would amount to allowing one jury' s factual findings
to be reexamined by another in violation of the Seventh
Amendment. 155 In particular, since fact of injury is an elem ent of the
Ru le 1Ob-5 cause of action, a finding of liability implies a finding of
mJury. 156 Allowing a second jury to determine the amount of
damages raises the possibility that the amount could be zero, an
obvious conflict. Additionally, unless some provision is made for a
more efficient calculation of damages, bifurcation does not solve the
problem of overwhelming the court's resources. 157
Statistical calculation of damages is permissible in some
circumstances, as when it is used to determine the appropriate
awards to plaintiffs whose injuries have already been established. 158
However, it cannot be used to eliminate the need to prove fact of
injury on an individual basis, at least not where fact of injury is an
element of the cause of action. 159 Consequently, plaintiffs will need

153. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124,
141 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing bifurcation as a management tool for addressing
damages in a class action).
154. See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677,
690 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (fmding class action manageable because of the use of
statistical analysis to calculate damages for class members); Windham v. Amer.
Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that individual damage
claims do not present a manageability problem if they are amenable to formula
calculation) .
155. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423 n.21 (5th Cir.
1998); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting
mandamus petition seeking decertification in HIV /hemophiliac case based in part
on concerns about the bifurcation plan adopted by the district court).
156. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th
Cir. 1981) (listing elements of cause of action under Rule 10(b)(5)), rev'd on other
grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
157. See Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 72 (4th Cir. 1977)
("Whether dealt with in a unitary trial or in a severed trial, the problem of proof of
the individual claims and of the essential elements of individual injury and damage
will remain and severance could only postpone the difficulty of such proof.").
158. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d
154, 188 (3d Cir. 2001 ).
159. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc ., 155 F.3d 331,
343 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the average loss of individual plaintiffs was not
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to prove non-zero damages without resorting to statistical methods,
and the ability to employ statistics in a subsequent calculation m ay
do little to alleviate manageability problems. 160

VI.

CONCLU SION

Rule 23(f) has ushered in a new era of appellate court
involvem ent in certification decisions. The next few years w ill see
The increased
rapid development of class certifi cation law.
availability of appellate review gi ves defense counsel greater
opportunity to oppose reflexive class certification in securities fraud
cases, and this opportunity should be embraced. The cases are on the
way; 407 fed eral securities fraud class actions have been fil ed so far
thi s year, an all-time record and nearly double last year ' s total of
216. 161 W hen the dust settles, it may tum out that certification of
securities fraud class actions is no longer a foregone conclusion.

sufficient to certify class and that the actual losses of individual plaintiffs, which
varied substantially, must be determined); In re Fibreboard Co., 893 F.2d 706, 7 12
(5th Cir. 1990) (denying certification of2990 asbestos plaintiffs where type of harm
suffered varied substantially, making statistical calculation of the average damages
suffered impermissible); Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1201-13
(6th Cir. 1988) (holding that damages attributed to injuries unsupported by
insufficient medical testimony needed to be recalculated); Windham v. Am. Brands,
Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 70-72 (4th Cir. 1977) (denying class certification where, among
other things , claims would require individual proof at trial); Kline v. Co ldwell,
Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1974) (establishing that proof of
injury is an essential element of damages); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90
(9th Cir. 1974) (stating that it is improper to bypass individual damage calculations).
160. In some cases, however, an inability to calculate damages mechanically
will provide a sufficient ground to refuse certification. See, e. g., Windham, 565 F .2d
at 68 ("[W]here the issue of damages and impact does not lend itself to . . . a
mechanical calculation, but requires 'separate mini-trial[s]' of an overwhelming[ly]
large number of individual claims, courts have found that the 'staggering problems
of logistics' thus created 'make the damage aspect of [the] case predominate,' and
render the case unmanageable as a class action."); Abrams v. Interco , Inc ., 719 F .2d
23, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming denial of certification in antitrust case on
manageability grounds because of the individualized nature of the necessary
determinations regarding damages and other issues); Cont'l Orthopedic Appliances,
Inc. v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., Inc ., 198 F.R.D. 41, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(denying certification in antitrust case in pmt because amount of damages w as not
susceptible to common proof using a formula or economic model).
161. See Jonathan D. Glater, Flood of Lawsuits Puts Underwriters in Cross
Hairs, N.Y. TIM ES, Dec. 2, 2001, at BU4.

